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Abstract 
 
We weave together care-giving, gender, and migration. We hypothesize that daughters 
who are mothers have a stronger incentive than sons who are fathers to demonstrate to 
their children the appropriate way of caring for one’s parents. The reason underlying this 
hypothesis is that women on average live longer than men, they tend to marry men who 
are older than they are and, thus, they are more likely than men to spend their last years 
without a spouse. Because it is more effective and less costly to care for parents if they 
live nearby, daughters with children do not move as far away from the parental home as 
sons with children or childless offspring. Data on the distance between the children’s 
location and the parents’ location extracted from the Survey of Health, Ageing and 
Retirement in Europe (SHARE), in conjunction with data on selected demographic 
characteristics and institutional indicators taken from Eurostat, the OECD, and the World 
Bank, lend support to our hypothesis: compared to childless daughters, childless sons, 
and sons who are fathers, daughters who are mothers choose to live closer to their 
parents’ home.  
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1. Introduction  
In this paper we present a new hypothesis that links together three themes: intergenerational 
care-giving, gender differences in intergenerational care-giving, and gender differences in 
migration (location) choices. The link is formed by the demonstration effect. In a nutshell, the 
idea behind this is that care-giving is influenced by a desire for future receipt of care.  
Because women on average live longer than men and tend to marry men who are older than 
they are, they are more likely than men to spend their last years without a spouse. If care 
given by parents, P, to their parents, G, serves to demonstrate to children, K, desired future 
care-giving behavior to P when K become P and P become G, then daughters who are 
mothers are more likely to engage in demonstration effect activities than sons who are fathers: 
daughters stand to gain more than sons from instilling the desired behavior in their children. 
And because it is more effective and less costly to demonstrate care-giving to parents when 
they and their children live near to each other, we conjecture that daughters who have children 
will migrate less far from the parental home than sons who have children, less far than 
childless sons, and less far than childless daughters.  
In the US in 2013, for example, women’s life expectancy was about five years greater 
than men’s.1 And in 2014, women married men that, on average, were two years older.2 
Therefore, on average, a man has his wife beside him as he ages, but a woman risks spending 
her last years alone. In the absence of a husband (partner), elderly women may have to rely on 
their children for support. Consequently, women may be more motivated to engage in 
demonstration effect activities. Empirical evidence that in the US daughters look after aging 
parents more intensively than sons is consistent with this reasoning (Finley, 1989; Lee et al., 
1993; Ettner, 1996; Hiedemann and Stern, 1999; Stark, 1999; Engers and Stern, 2002; Cox 
and Stark, 2005). For example, using data from the 1987 National Survey of Families and 
Households, Ettner (1996, p. 201) finds that “… caregiving [for parents] appears to have a 
larger impact on female work hours than on male work hours.” Drawing on data from the 
1982 to 1984 waves of the National Long-Term Care Survey, Hiedemann and Stern (1999, p. 
55) observe that daughters are more likely than sons to care for their parents. On the basis of 
the same dataset for the year 1984, Engers and Stern (2002, p. 92) conclude that “daughters 
                                               
1 According to National Center for Health Statistics (Xu et al., 2016), in the US in 2013 women’s life expectancy 
was 81.2, whereas men’s was 76.4. In the EU in 2013 a 5.6 year difference in life expectancy was observed 
(Eurostat on-line database available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database).   
2 According to the US Census Bureau (2014), in 2014 the median age at first marriage of women was 27.6, and 
of men 29.5. The data were retrieved by the authors of this paper using American FactFinder 
<http://factfinder.census.gov>, (4 April 2016). 
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are more likely to provide care than sons … and married children are more likely to provide 
care than single children.” 
Many cultures and religions encourage adult children to be, or assign adult children to 
act as, care-givers to their parents. Confucian writings and the Old Testament tell children 
they have a duty to take care of their parents. In general, there is no gender-specificity in this 
regard; it is children rather than sons or daughters who are held responsible. The 
predominance in many cultures of adult daughters as primary care-givers could be an 
extension of the natural task of childcare into adult-care in conjunction with an optimal 
division of labor under the constraints and opportunities prevailing at the time.3 However, in 
present day societies, it is quite often the case that calculation rather than religious teachings 
and moral traditions guide individuals’ behavior. The hypothesis advanced in this paper is in 
line with this premise. 
Our hypothesis does not contradict other ways of thinking about the optimal migration 
distance of daughters. Many different mechanisms governing this could be at work. For 
example, single motherhood, which is more prevalent than single fatherhood, means that 
daughters find it valuable to live near their parents so they have a sense of belonging and are 
better able to cope. A grandparent’s potential help with childcare can affect the choice of how 
far the daughter will migrate.  
In Sections 2 and 3 we present the components that add up to the hypothesis that 
daughters who have children live closer to their parents than childless daughters, childless 
sons, and sons who have children. A model that yields a negative relationship between the 
optimal migration distance and the importance attached to the care to be received from 
children in the future is presented in Appendix A. Complementary considerations are brought 
up in section 4. In section 5 we use data on the distance between the children’s and the 
parents’ locations extracted from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe 
(SHARE) to test for differences in migration behavior by gender and by parenthood status. 
We draw on data for four European countries - two northern countries, Denmark and Sweden, 
and two more southern countries, Belgium and France - collected in four waves 1, 2, 4, and 5 
                                               
3 There are a good number of studies on gender differences in the provision of care for parents in their old age. 
For example, Finley (1989) reports that daughters provide more care for elderly mothers than sons do, regardless 
of the time constraints, external resources, and attitudes towards obligations. Lee et al. (1993) complement this 
finding by showing that a parent is more likely to receive care from a child of the same sex. Similar observations 
are reported, for example, by Arber and Ginn (1995) who examine the degree of men’s and women’s provision 
of various forms of informal care.  
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taken, respectively, in 2004, 2006/2007, 2011/2012, and 2013.4 Specific coefficients obtained 
from estimation of the econometric models related to each of the four countries are presented 
in Appendix B. We find that the patterns of migration are in line with our hypothesis: 
daughters who are mothers live closer to their parents’ home than comparable childless 
daughters, childless sons, and sons who are fathers. The difference between the migration 
pattern of daughters who are mothers and sons who are fathers varies by country, and appears 
to be influenced by the institutional context, especially the extent to which elderly care is 
provided by the state. The difference between the location of daughters who are mothers and 
the location of sons who are fathers is significant in Belgium and France where state-provided 
elderly care is relatively weak, but not in Denmark and Sweden where state-provided elderly 
care is generous. Women residing in European countries with weaker elderly care are more 
likely to demonstrate to their children how to care for parents, leading to differentiation in the 
migration behavior by gender. In section 6 we discuss limitations of the empirical analysis 
and present complementary reflections. In section 7 we conclude.  
 
2. The demonstration effect  
The “demonstration effect in intergenerational transfers” is an approach that seeks to explain 
why adult children provide care, companionship, and other forms of assistance and attention 
to their parents.  
The demonstration effect perspective is based on the premise that adult children seek 
to shape the attitudes and preferences of their children so that in due course the latter will 
provide the former with the attention and care they desire: adult children who are parents 
inculcate in their children, by demonstration, the type of behavior that the parents want their 
children to replicate in the future. This perspective expands the domain of analysis of 
intergenerational interaction from two to three generations. It focuses on the perception that a 
child’s conduct is conditioned by parental example, and it assumes that adult children as 
parents take advantage of their children’s learning potential by showing attention to and 
caring for their own parents when the children are present so that they observe and are 
impressed. In Stark (1999) the demonstration effect idea was developed formally and tested 
                                               
4 These are SHARE Waves 10.6103/SHARE.w1.600, 10.6103/SHARE.w2.600, 10.6103/SHARE.w4.600, and 
10.6103/SHARE.w5.600.  
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empirically. Additional evidence in support of the demonstration effect is in Cox and Stark 
(2005), and in Mitrut and Wolff (2009).  
More concretely, consider a family consisting of members of three generations: a 
child, K, a parent, P, and a grandparent, G. Each person lives for three periods: first as K, then 
as P, and finally as G. P wants to receive help from K in the next period when P becomes G 
and K becomes P. To demonstrate to K the appropriate way of behaving in the next period, P 
provides visible help to G when K is around to watch and learn. It follows that attention and 
care from P to G depend positively on the presence of children of an impressionable age.5 In 
Appendix A we present a model that links these considerations with optimal migration 
choices. 
The idea that attention and care given to parents (G) is aimed at instilling appropriate 
conduct in children (K) generates an array of insights, including gender differentiation and 
migration choices.  
 
3. Migration choices 
Because daughters who are mothers are more inclined to engage in demonstration effect 
activities than sons who are fathers, the former will have a stronger preference to live near 
their parents than the latter. This is so for three interrelated reasons: effectiveness, cost, and 
the inherent value of demonstration.  
Effectiveness 
Parents typically teach children appropriate behavior by setting an example. To be effective, 
the example has to be vivid, and repeated. Such acts might well be costly to parents who need 
to behave differently than they would if they were not concerned with shaping their children’s 
preferences.  
By way of illustration, suppose that care can be provided in a lump form or in 
installments that amount to the same total. If repeated and regular small-scale acts of care 
have a greater influence in shaping behavior than a single large-scale act, the presence and 
age of children will affect the distribution of care-giving. Experimental evidence from 
cognitive psychology indicates that distributed repetition is better than mass input for 
                                               
5 Conventional theories of the allocation of time and money within the family could well predict the opposite 
effect because young children place demands on their parents’ time and income, so that the competing presence 
of young children will reduce the assistance that P gives to G. 
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stimulating recall in situations involving memory and learning (Glass et al., 1979). Further, 
Bandura (1986) cites numerous studies in which repetition strengthens the influence of one 
person’s behavior on another’s. In particular, Bandura cites evidence that such repetition is 
effective when using role models to mold the moral development of children. 
Furthermore, the demonstration effect implies that the composition of transfers from P 
to G is important. As already noted, the transfers have to be visible. In-kind transfers are 
better than cash and, if transfers take the form of attention, visits are better than telephone 
calls. It is of interest to note that several studies (Warnes, 1984; Crimmins and Ingegneri, 
1990; Smith, 1998) have found that proximity is a key determinant of the intensity of 
intergenerational interaction. 
Cost  
Living near G reduces P’s cost of engaging in effective demonstration activities. Other things 
being equal, the greater involvement in demonstration effect activities of daughters who are 
mothers than of sons who are fathers, childless daughters, and childless sons will make the 
former less inclined to move further away from the parental home than the latter. 
The inherent value of demonstration 
By living near to G, P demonstrates to K a migration pattern that P will want K to replicate in 
the future. Thus, choosing to live near G not only makes it easy for P to provide attention and 
care to G, but also enables P to influence K’s future location decisions in a way that will 
render more likely the future provision of attention and care by K (by then P) to P (by then 
G).  
The considerations of effectiveness, cost, and the inherent value of demonstration 
suggest that demonstration effect activities will discourage daughters who are mothers from 
migrating, and if they do migrate, ensure they do not go far away.  
 
4. Additional considerations 
Clearly, the demonstration effect is not the only reason for children to provide their parents 
with attention and care. Other obvious reasons are altruism, aspiration to inherit, an implicit 
long-term contractual arrangement of exchange of support, and social pressures. However, 
there may not be good reasons to expect differentiation by gender with regard to several of 
these factors. For example, data from the Health and Retirement Study in the US for 1995 to 
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2010 on the division of estates by parents reveal that the likelihood of equal bequests is linked 
with the contact that parents had with their children: parents are 40 percent more likely to plan 
to bequeath unequally when they had no contact with their children for more than a year 
(Francesconi et al., 2015). The reward to children for remaining close to their parents in the 
form of a larger share of the inheritance is not, however, related to gender, so an aspiration to 
inherit cannot explain the difference between the proximity to the parental location of 
daughters and sons. More specifically, there is no reason or indication that daughters will be 
less likely than sons to receive a smaller share of the inheritance if they fail to keep in contact 
with their parents, so there is no reason on that account for them to seek greater closeness to 
the parental home than sons. 
The demonstration effect idea cannot be operational when there are G but no K to 
demonstrate to (or, for that matter, when there are K but no G to care for). Interestingly, if 
there are no K and if the reason for P holding back on having children is a financial constraint 
(say inadequate housing), G will be willing to provide help with housing down-payments in 
order to encourage the production of grandchildren. Thus, the demonstration effect approach 
generates a demand for grandchildren because potential grandparents expect to be treated 
better by their adult children if the latter have their own children to whom they can 
demonstrate appropriate behavior. Cox and Stark (2005) present empirical evidence of 
behavior that is consistent with subsidizing the production of grandchildren and the 
demonstration effect. 
Consider a daughter with children and a son with children. The son’s wife seeks to 
demonstrate to her children how parents should be cared for. This will discourage her from 
migrating farther afield from her parents. But why could she not demonstrate the desirable 
behavior by attending to her parents-in-law, in which case her other migration considerations 
do not need to come into play? One factor that could work against such a targeting of care-
giving is that her children (when becoming P) might follow suit by caring for their parents-in-
law, which is not what she will want her demonstration to lead to. 
The provision of care to parents by both daughters and sons is influenced by the 
availability of care from other sources. The generosity of a country’s elderly care policies is 
likely to affect the provision of care within the family, and is likely to impact on mothers’ 
engagement in demonstration effect activities. In particular, we would expect that in a country 
that caters well for its elderly population, mothers will not have so much of an incentive to 
demonstrate to their children appropriate care-giving behavior and, consequently, the 
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hypothesized gender divide in migration outcomes will be weaker. This reasoning implies that 
in a country in which there is generous state provision for old age, the migration behavior of 
men who are fathers and women who are mothers will converge to a higher degree than the 
comparable migration behavior in a country in which state-provided old-age care is meager. 
An interesting reinforcing channel of intergenerational transmission of preferences 
relates to K observing the care-giving behavior of both his mother and his father and noting 
that care-giving to G is administered by K’s mother or, for that matter, by mothers in general. 
This exposure reinforces the gender difference in response to the demonstration effect acts of 
P and, consequently, influences K’s migration decisions in that it impacts on sons’ perception 
of their own duties and the duties of their wives. So sons become aware that their wives’ care-
giving obligation toward their own parents is stronger than their obligation toward their 
parents. Therefore, sons may not object to living close to their parents-in-law, especially if the 
sons have sisters living near to their parents. 
Because the preceding reasoning refers to daughters as mothers, it should not be 
interpreted to imply that women in general are expected to exhibit the migratory behavior we 
postulate: an empirical test will be whether the migration behavior of daughters who are 
mothers differs both from the migration behavior of sons who are fathers and from the 
migration behavior of childless daughters and sons.  
The importance of the presence of K when the “story” begins may diminish as the 
story progresses. The reason for this is that once K are trained and conditioned to attend to 
their parents, when K become P and their parents become G, having children in order to 
ensure that the current P provides attention and care for the current G is not necessary. The 
presence of children could, of course, serve to reinforce the provision of care due to 
demonstration effect incentives but, as such, is secondary because care-giving happens 
because of inculcation, not demonstration.  
Other explanations could also be considered. For example, P can provide attention and 
care to G not by living near G, but by bringing G to live with P. The demonstration effect 
approach predicts that this is more likely when P want K to treat them similarly. But this 
possibility does not “crowd out” the migration consideration because it is usually the case that 
G will prefer to stay in their own home, and P may also not find it feasible or practical to 
make such an arrangement. A similar consideration applies to placing G in a care home, 
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especially if P do not want their K to treat them similarly. Thus, on average, the distance 
consideration still holds. 
There is an interesting parallel between the demonstration effect idea and the 
intergenerational transmission of religiosity (Clark and Worthington, 1987; Hayes and 
Pittelkow, 1993; Hoge et al., 1982; Ozorak, 1989; Thomson et al., 1992). In the latter context, 
more frequent attendance at religious services with the children exposes them to religious 
practice, with the expectation that children who are endowed with more “religiosity capital” 
will be more likely to be religious as adults. In the religiosity sphere, the transmission of a 
trait via socialization parallels in our context the transmission of caring for parents via 
demonstration. In both settings, engagement in shaping preferences involves costs, confers 
rewards in the form of children behaving like their parents, and requires choices of intensity 
of socialization and the demonstration effort.  
 
5. Empirical analysis of migration behavior by gender and by parenthood status 
We study differences in the distance between the parents’ location and that of their adult 
children caused by the migration of the children. We do this by gender and by parenthood 
status for individuals who have moved out of the parental home. We use information that we 
extract from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). In our 
analysis, we pool data from four waves (1, 2, 4 and 5), which correspond approximately to 
years 2004, 2006/2007, 2011/2012, and 2013 (respectively).6,7 SHARE provides a 
harmonized longitudinal dataset covering topics related to individual socio-economic status, 
health, and family relationships. The distinctive feature of the data is that they cover 
individuals (respondents) aged 50 and over. Because SHARE includes information on the 
respondents’ children and grandchildren, it enables us to track family relationships across 
three generations.  
 
 
                                               
6 The exact year for each wave differs from country to country. A detailed description of the dataset and the 
survey methodology is in Börsch-Supan and Jürges (2005). 
7 In the first two waves of SHARE, information about children is collected about the four oldest children who 
live in the closest proximity to their parents. In order to check whether this restriction affects our reported 
results, we studied the distribution of the geographical proximity of children by gender and by parenthood status, 
and we re-ran the analysis on the basis of a subset of the data which excludes the first two waves of the survey. 
We found that the restriction does not affect our findings and, thus, we report findings based on an analysis of all 
four waves of the survey.     
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5.1. Characteristics of the countries selected for the analysis 
The analysis of the distance between the parents’ location and that of their children is 
conducted for four selected countries covered by SHARE data. The countries are divided into 
two subsets consisting of (1) Denmark and Sweden, and (2) Belgium and France. The 
selection of the countries and their allocation to the two subsets is motivated jointly by the 
countries’ degree of population mobility, demographic characteristics, and institutional 
characteristics regarding state support for the elderly, which are all of importance to us in 
seeking to track behavior that is consistent with the demonstration effect hypothesis. 
We confine our analysis to the four countries covered by SHARE that, according to 
Eurostat data, are characterized by the highest level of mobility, as measured by the 
proportion of the population that has moved within the past five years. As can be seen in 
Table 1, the proportion of the population that has moved within the past five years is 22-27 
percent in Belgium and France, and 34-40 percent in Denmark and Sweden.8 Limiting the 
sample to countries with a high level of population mobility is necessary for our analysis 
because parenthood is not exogenously given and, consequently, it is possible that an 
individual chooses first the location of residence, and thereafter decides to bear children. By 
focusing on countries with high population mobility we focus on countries in which the 
chances of changing the place of residence after having children are relatively high.9  
The choice of the four countries is further guided by their similar demographic 
characteristics concerning old-age dependency ratio, life expectancy of men and women, and 
gender difference at the age at marriage. As shown in Table 1, in all four countries the old-age 
dependency ratios of about 24-28 are high, implying that in terms of the proportion of older 
people, the countries share a similar demographic structure. In the four countries, the life 
expectancy of men is about 77-79 years, and that of women is about 81-85 years. In Belgium 
and France women’s comparative longevity is somewhat greater than in Denmark and 
Sweden: in the former countries the gender gap in life expectancy is between 5.6 years and 7 
years, whereas in the latter countries it is about 4 years. Other factors being the same, this 
                                               
8 Comparable high levels of mobility are observed for Luxembourg (27.2%), Netherlands (24.6%), Germany 
(21.9%), and Austria (20.2%). The remaining countries covered by SHARE are characterized by much lower 
population mobility, with the fraction of the population that has moved within the past five years ranging from 
15% (Estonia) to 7% (Hungary). Because of low population mobility, we did not include in our analysis 
Southern European countries and several Central and Eastern European countries even though for these countries 
SHARE data are available.  
9 Although the SHARE data contain information on the distance between the parents’ home and the children’s 
homes, the data do not include information on the migration history of the children. Given this limitation, we 
elicited information on population mobility at country level from the Eurostat data. 
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difference could imply that women in Belgium and France have a stronger incentive than 
women in Denmark and Sweden to engage in demonstration effect activities. Furthermore, in 
all four countries women marry men who, on average, are older than they are, implying, as 
already noted in the Introduction, that in old age women are at a higher risk of spending the 
last years of their life without a spouse, having to depend more on care provided by their 
children than men do. The average gap between a husband’s age and a wife’s age in the four 
countries ranges between 2 and 2.7 years.  
We distinguish between the two subsets of the four selected countries also by 
differences in their old-age policies, as well as in their public perception with regard to the 
identity of the primary care-giver of the elderly. As shown in Table 1, while in Denmark and 
Sweden state support for the elderly is quite generous, in Belgium and France the support is 
relatively weak. In particular, according to information from Eurostat and OECD data, 
whereas Denmark and Sweden allocate around 2 percent of their GDP to assistance for the 
elderly, Belgium and France spend on such assistance less than 0.3 percent of their GDP. 
Information from Eurobarometer (2007) survey data reveals that the populace in these two 
groups of countries holds contrasting views regarding the role of children as care-providers to 
their elderly parents. For example, in Belgium and France around 40-50 percent of the 
respondents agree with the statement that children should support their parents (and pay for 
their care if the parents’ income is insufficient), whereas in Denmark and Sweden fewer than 
15 percent of the respondents concur with this statement. Given this difference, and given the 
relatively high expenditures on elderly care in the two northern countries, we can infer that in 
these countries elderly care is provided externally, leaving a relatively small role for, and 
limited expectations with regard to, care provision by the children.  
In conclusion, in Denmark and Sweden the existing old-age policies can be 
characterized as relatively generous, with the state supporting elderly care, whereas in 
Belgium and France state support for the elderly is relatively meager. The variation in state 
support for the elderly allows us to assess the role of factors such as the generosity of the 
welfare state and country-specific perceptions about elderly care, in the strength of the 
demonstration effect. It might then be expected that the incidence of demonstration effect 
behavior and of the implications of the demonstration effect model will be more powerful in 
Belgium and France than in Denmark and Sweden. It is in the former countries, where 
institutional elderly care is limited, that elderly care is more dependent on the family than in 
the latter countries.  
   11 
Table 1. Demographic and institutional indicators for the selected countries 
Indicator 
Mobility Demographic characteristics Old age: expenditures and opinion  
The 
proportion 
of the 
population 
that has 
moved 
within the 
past five 
years 
Old-age 
dependency 
ratio 
Life expectancy 
at birth - male 
Life expectancy 
at birth - female 
Difference 
between 
wife’s age 
and 
husband’s 
age 
Expenditures on 
care for elderly: 
% of GDP 
Expenditures on 
old age other 
than cash: % of 
GDP 
Children should 
pay for the care of 
their parents if 
their parents’ 
income is 
insufficient: % of 
respondents who 
agree with the 
statement 
Source Eurostat (1) Eurostat (2) World Bank (3) World Bank (4) EU SILC (5) Eurostat (6) OECD (7) Eurobarometer (8) 
 
Denmark  34.3 24.28 77.1 81.2 -2.1 1.7 2.06 12 
Sweden  40.2 27.52 79.5 83.5 -2.7 2.35 2.34 15 
 
Belgium 22 26.28 76.9 82.5 -2.2 0.05 0.09 43 
France 27 25.7 77.6 84.6 -2.4 0.33 0.31 48 
Notes: The old-age dependency ratio represents the share of individuals aged 65+ relative to the share of the working age population. Expenditures on care for the 
elderly provided by Eurostat represents social protection expenditures devoted to old age care, including expenditures to cover care allowance, accommodation, 
and assistance in carrying out daily tasks. Expenditures on old age other than cash provided by OECD data represent public and mandatory private expenditures 
on non-cash benefits (in-kind benefits) for old age. The data presented in columns (1) through (8) refer to / are obtained as follows. The column (1) data are for 
year 2012, and are extracted from an on-line database available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database. The column (2) data represent a mean value for the 
years of the SHARE rounds 2004-2013, and are extracted from an on-line database available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database. The data in Columns 
(3) and (4) represent a mean value for the years of the SHARE rounds 2004-2013, and are extracted from the World Bank World Development Indicators on-line 
database available at http://databank.worldbank.org/data/. The column (5) data refer to year 2012, and are extracted from the European Union Statistics on 
Income and Living Conditions. (Referred to as EU SILC, this is an individual (micro) level database distributed by Eurostat on request.) The column (6) data 
represent a mean value for the years 2004-2008, and are extracted from an on-line database available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database. The column (7) 
data represent a mean value for the years 2004-2011, and are extracted from an on-line database OECD.Stat available at http://stats.oecd.org/. The column (8) 
data refer to the year 2007, and are extracted from Eurobarometer (2007).  
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Table 2. Summary statistics of the key variables for the selected countries 
Variable/Country 
Denmark  Sweden  Belgium France 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Variables referring to an individual (P) 
Distance: 0-5 km 0.24 0.427 0.259 0.438 0.375 0.484 0.238 0.426 
Distance: 5-25 km 0.278 0.448 0.23 0.421 0.336 0.473 0.233 0.423 
Distance: 25-100 km 0.237 0.425 0.185 0.388 0.197 0.397 0.195 0.396 
Distance: 100 + km 0.246 0.431 0.326 0.469 0.092 0.289 0.335 0.472 
Having children indicator 0.655 0.475 0.66 0.474 0.700 0.458 0.684 0.465 
Female 0.509 0.5 0.501 0.5 0.513 0.500 0.500 0.500 
Age 39.637 10.931 39.981 10.289 40.438 10.144 40.967 10.969 
Married or in a relationship  0.625 0.484 0.702 0.458 0.745 0.436 0.682 0.466 
Married but living separately from a spouse 0.009 0.094 0.003 0.054 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.118 
Divorced  0.093 0.290 0.065 0.246 0.088 0.284 0.072 0.259 
Widowed 0.009 0.094 0.004 0.067 0.013 0.112 0.013 0.113 
Working indicator 0.774 0.418 0.835 0.371 0.833 0.373 0.802 0.398 
Number of siblings 2.761 1.051 2.829 1.116 2.882 1.228 2.942 1.298 
Being the youngest child indicator  0.417 0.493 0.411 0.492 0.403 0.490 0.401 0.490 
Education: pre-primary and primary 0.016 0.126 0.014 0.116 0.036 0.185 0.089 0.284 
Education: lower secondary 0.109 0.312 0.114 0.318 0.112 0.315 0.068 0.252 
Education: upper secondary and secondary non-tertiary 0.432 0.495 0.523 0.499 0.361 0.480 0.406 0.491 
Education: first and second stage tertiary 0.443 0.497 0.349 0.477 0.491 0.500 0.437 0.496 
Variables referring to an individual’s parent (G) 
Presence of a partner  0.606 0.489 0.71 0.454 0.597 0.490 0.550 0.498 
Good health indicator 0.745 0.436 0.727 0.446 0.692 0.462 0.600 0.490 
Place of living: a big city 0.111 0.314 0.122 0.327 0.091 0.287 0.072 0.258 
Place of living: the suburbs or outskirts of a big city 0.157 0.364 0.172 0.378 0.148 0.355 0.126 0.332 
Place of living: a large town 0.227 0.419 0.314 0.464 0.134 0.340 0.122 0.327 
Place of living: a small town 0.282 0.45 0.222 0.416 0.378 0.485 0.276 0.447 
Place of living: a rural area or village 0.225 0.417 0.17 0.376 0.250 0.433 0.404 0.491 
Number of observations 12,083 15,017 17,361 16,665 
Note: “Being the youngest child indicator” is a dummy variable equal to one if an individual is the youngest child or the only child in the family, and zero 
otherwise.  
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5.2. Econometric approach 
A key variable of interest to us, namely the distance between the child’s location and the parent’s 
location, is coded in the SHARE data as a categorical variable, where distance is measured by 
nine categories, ranging from 0 km (including living in the same building), to more than 500 km 
(including living in another country). Because of the largely unequal distribution of the categories 
(with several of the categories including quite small numbers of cases), we re-coded this variable 
and defined four main aggregate categories of distance: 0-5 km, 5-25 km, 25-100 km, and more 
than 100 km. The mean values of these categories are shown in Table 2. A comparison of the 
shares of the four distance categories for the analyzed countries reveals that Denmark, Sweden, 
and France exhibit comparable distributions, whereas Belgium displays relatively greater shares 
of individuals living 0-5 km and 5-25 away from the parental home. It is plausible that this 
pattern arises from Belgium being a small country where cities are concentrated within a small 
radius.  
The empirical investigation of migration behavior by gender and parenthood status is 
done separately for each country and is based on estimation of the following equation:  
 ( )* 0 1 2 3i i i i i i iy parent female parent female xα α α α α ε= + + + × + +  (1) 
where i denotes an individual (namely an adult child P, as per the notation used in the preceding 
sections); *iy  is a continuous latent variable for the distance between the individual and the 
individual’s parent;  the α ’s are coefficients that will be estimated so as to assess the impact of 
each variable on *iy ; and iε  is an error term. Given that *iy  is a latent variable, and given that 
only the categorical variable measuring the distance between an individual’s location and her / 
his parent’s location is available in the dataset, we base our analysis on estimation of an ordered 
logit model and of a set of binary logit models. In the ordered logit model, the categories of the 
dependent variable are as specified in Table 2: the variable takes a value of 1 if the distance is 
between 0-5 km, a value of 2 if the distance is between 5-25 km, a value of 3 if the distance is 
between 25-100 km, and a value of 4 if the distance is greater than 100 km. Because the 
estimation of the ordered logit model relies on a restrictive assumption of the proportional odds, 
meaning that the “distance” between adjacent categories is assumed to be the same, we 
complement the ordered logit analysis with estimations of less restrictive binary logit models in 
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which the dependent variables are dummy variables recoded on the basis of the four distance 
categories listed above.10,11 As a result, three binary logits are specified with the dependent 
variables defined as: (1) 1 if living farther than 5 km away, and 0 otherwise; (2) 1 if living farther 
than 25 km away, and 0 otherwise; (3) 1 if living farther than 100 km away, and 0 otherwise.  
In all the models, the main independent variables are denoted as parent, female, and 
parent female× . The variables represent, respectively, a dummy variable for parenthood status 
(1 if an individual has at least one child, 0 otherwise), a dummy variable for gender (1 if an 
individual is female, 0 otherwise), and a dummy variable obtained from interacting the latter two. 
In the models, we additionally include a set of control variables, denoted by ix , that may affect 
the choice of the migration distance. The control variables include the individual’s age, dummy 
variables for education levels based on the 1997 International Standard Classification of 
Education (ISCED) codes,12 a dummy indicator reflecting whether an individual is the youngest 
child (1 if yes, 0 otherwise), the total number of siblings, a dummy indicator for employment 
status (1 if an individual is working, 0 otherwise), and four dummy indicators for marital status (1 
if the individual is married or has a partner, 0 otherwise; 1 if the individual is married but living 
separately from a spouse, 0 otherwise; 1 if the individual is divorced, 0 otherwise; 1 if the 
individual is widowed, 0 otherwise). Because the SHARE data lack information on individuals’ 
incomes, accounting for the individuals’ age and education is used to capture the individuals’ 
human capital and, consequently, to indirectly account for the individuals’ earning potential. 
Additionally, we include variables that characterize the parents of the individuals, which may 
potentially affect the parents’ need for care and, consequently, influence the individual’s 
migration choices. These variables are a dummy indicator for parental partnership (1 if the parent 
is living with a partner, 0 otherwise), a dummy indicator for the parental health condition (1 if at 
                                               
10 We tested the validity of the proportional odds assumption in the estimated ordered logit models using the Brant 
test (1990), and concluded that several independent variables seem to violate the assumption. 
11 Other models that could be used include a multinomial logit model and a generalized ordered logit. As checks of 
robustness, we also estimated these models. The main conclusions drawn from these tests are consistent with the 
conclusions presented in the paper. The unreported results are available on request.  
12 The education levels are defined as follows: pre-primary and primary education (ISCED levels 0 and 1); lower 
secondary or second stage of basic education (ISCED level 2); upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary 
(ISCED levels 3 and 4); and first and second stage tertiary (ISCED levels 5 and 6). 
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least in good health, 0 otherwise), and dummy variables for the type of place of living.13 All the 
models also feature time fixed effects. 
The sample is restricted to individuals aged 18 years and older who have moved out of the 
parental home. The sample size for each country and the country means of the control variables 
are shown in Table 2. The size of the final sample differs by country, with the largest number of 
observations for Belgium (17,361), and the smallest number of observations for Denmark 
(12,083). With regard to several key variables, including gender, parenthood status, and a number 
of demographic characteristics, the country samples are quite similar. The samples differ, 
however, in terms of the status of the parents’ health: in Belgium and France, the share of parents 
reporting being in good health is lower than in Denmark and Sweden. This observation could 
help explain why in Belgium and France children (daughters and sons alike) might be more 
concerned about, and be more engaged in, the care of their parents than children in Denmark and 
Sweden: the frail health of G today can serve as a predictor of P’s health status tomorrow, leading 
to greater worry and a stronger inclination to secure support later on when P become G. 
As per equation (1), in the estimated models we account for parenthood status, for gender, 
and for an interaction term between these two variables, which allows us to test whether the 
migration behavior of daughters who have children is different from the migration behavior of 
sons who have children, as well as from the migration behavior of childless daughters and sons. 
Specifically, we compare the “migration proximity” of the “group” of daughters that have 
children with the other three “groups,” in order to unravel whether: 
1.! Daughters who have children (mothers) move closer to their parents’ location than 
childless daughters (non-mothers); 
2.! Daughters who have children (mothers) move closer to their parents’ location than sons 
who have children (fathers); 
3.! Daughters who have children (mothers) move closer to their parents’ location than 
childless sons (non-fathers). 
                                               
13 It might be expected that parents who live together with a partner will have less need to be cared for by their 
children. Parents who are in good health may also have less need for such care. And likewise in the case of parents 
who live in urban areas where institutional elderly support is more readily available than in rural areas. 
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To test for differences in migration behavior, we perform a one-sided test for the 
significance of the linear combination of coefficients. The null hypothesis states that the 
estimated effect on the location choice is the same for the “group” of daughters who have 
children and for a specific other “group” (out of the three remaining “groups”). The alternative 
hypothesis states that the estimated effect for the “group” of daughters with children is lower than 
the estimated effect for a specific other “group.” The alternative hypothesis reflects a 
constellation where daughters who have children choose to live closer to their parents’ home than 
a specific other “group.” In particular, the hypotheses corresponding to the above listed 
expectations of the migration behavior of daughters with children are specified as follows (using 
the notation of the coefficients from equation (1)):  
1.! H0: 1 3 0α α+ = , against H1: 1 3 0α α+ < ; 
2.! H0: 2 3 0α α+ = , against H1: 2 3 0α α+ < ; 
3.! H0: 1 2 3 0α α α+ + = , against H1: 1 2 3 0α α α+ + < . 
The empirical approach specified above could have been strengthened if, additionally, the 
analysis could be run by the gender of a child (K). As shown by Mitrut and Wolff (2009), the 
strength of the demonstration effect differs by the gender of the child, and it is strongest for 
mothers of daughters. The SHARE dataset does not, however, provide us with information on the 
gender of K.  
5.3. Results  
In Table 3 we report p-values calculated for the three tests described in the Subsection 5.2, and 
for the four models used in the estimation, namely the ordered logit model and the three binary 
logit models. Because our interest is in the significance of the differences in the migration 
proximity between the “groups” of individuals rather than in the significance of the estimated 
coefficients, detailed estimated results for each country are relegated to Appendix B.14  
                                               
14 The size and significance of the coefficients on the variables included in the equations vary across countries and 
models. However, several consistent patterns regarding the effect of the variables can be ascertained. In particular, 
the coefficients on the interaction variable between gender and parenthood status suggest that the chances of living 
farther away from the parental home are significantly lower for women with children. The chances are also lower for 
individuals who work, and for individuals whose parents reside in urban areas. On the other hand, individuals who 
have a larger number of siblings, individuals who are better educated, and individuals whose parents are in good 
health, are more likely to live farther away from the parental home. Perhaps P who note that their parents, G, are in 
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The results related to the first hypothesis reveal small p-values for all countries, 
irrespective of the model used for estimation. This finding is in line with our hypothesis that 
daughters who have children are likely to migrate for a shorter distance from their parental home 
than otherwise comparable daughters who do not have children.  
As for the second hypothesis, we find some support for the argument that daughters who 
are mothers choose to live closer to their parents than sons who are fathers; in particular, small p-
values obtained from testing this hypothesis for Belgium and France indicate that for these 
countries, the argument is supported. Such an inference cannot be made, however, for Denmark 
and Sweden where the absence of a difference in migration behavior between daughters with 
children and sons with children might be related to the generosity of old-age policies in these 
countries: as a consequence of a well-developed welfare state that caters more extensively for the 
elderly, mothers do not need to engage in demonstration effect activities, so the migration 
behavior of men who are fathers and the migration behavior of women who are mothers tend to 
converge. In Belgium and France, where state support for elderly care is weaker, and to a greater 
extent care is provided within the family, the demonstration effect manifests itself more strongly, 
and a gender divide in migration behavior ensues.  
Finally, the p-values for the third hypothesis, presented in the third panel of Table 3, are 
small, suggesting that we should reject the null hypothesis of the equality of the migration 
behavior of daughters who are mothers and childless sons. For Belgium, France, and Sweden, 
small p-values are found, irrespective of the model used for estimation. For Denmark the p-
values are somewhat greater, especially in the case of the first binary logit model. 
In conclusion, the results presented in Table 3 are in line with the prediction of the model: 
compared to childless daughters, childless sons, and sons who have children, daughters who are 
mothers live closer to their parents’ location. The gender divide in the migration outcomes 
between children that already have their own children appears to be linked to the generosity of 
the welfare state, and is observed only in Belgium and France. Given the relatively low state 
support for elderly care and the relatively high comparative longevity of women in these 
countries, our findings suggest that women residing in these countries are more likely to engage 
in demonstration effect activities, leading to differentiation in migration behavior by gender.   
                                                                                                                                                        
good health have a reduced concern that they, as G, will require attention and care from their own children and, 
therefore, their motivation to demonstrate is reduced. 
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Table 3. P-values for tests of the significance of the linear combination of the coefficients on a parenthood 
dummy, a female dummy, and their interaction obtained from country-specific estimations of the ordered 
logit model and the set of binary logit models 
Country / 
Ordered logit Binary logit (1) Binary logit (2) Binary logit (3) 
Model 
  P-value Conclusion P-value Conclusion P-value Conclusion P-value Conclusion 
Test 1: Daughters with children (mothers M) migrate closer than daughters with no children (non-mothers 
NM) 
Denmark  0.000 dM<dNM 0.000 dM<dNM 0.000 dM<dNM 0.000 dM<dNM 
Sweden  0.000 dM<dNM 0.000 dM<dNM 0.000 dM<dNM 0.000 dM<dNM 
Belgium  0.000 dM<dNM 0.018 dM<dNM 0.000 dM<dNM 0.002 dM<dNM 
France  0.000 dM<dNM 0.000 dM<dNM 0.000 dM<dNM 0.000 dM<dNM 
Test 2: Daughters with children (mothers M) migrate closer than sons with children (fathers F) 
Denmark  0.394 
H0 not 
rejected 0.804 
H0 not 
rejected 0.616 
H0 not 
rejected 0.012 dM<dF 
Sweden  0.316 
H0 not 
rejected 0.634 
H0 not 
rejected 0.450 
H0 not 
rejected 0.160 
H0 not 
rejected 
Belgium  0.000 dM<dF 0.000 dM<dF 0.000 dM<dF 0.003  dM<dF 
France  0.009 dM<dF 0.002 dM<dF 0.037 dM<dF 0.101 
H0 not 
rejected 
Test 3: Daughters with children (mothers M) migrate closer than sons with no children (non-fathers NF) 
Denmark  0.008 dM<dNF 0.504 
H0 not 
rejected 0.003 dM<dNF 0.000 dM<dNF 
Sweden  0.000 dM<dNF 0.000 dM<dNF 0.003 dM<dNF 0.000 dM<dNF 
Belgium  0.000 dM<dNF 0.001 dM<dNF 0.000 dM<dNF 0.000 dM<dNF 
France  0.000 dM<dNF 0.000 dM<dNF 0.000 dM<dNF 0.000 dM<dNF 
 
Notes: The columns labeled “Conclusion” represent the final conclusion based on the p-value from the respective 
tests assuming a maximum significance level of 0.10. The statistical inference is based on cluster-robust standard 
errors. 
 
6. Complementary reflections 
Several reservations and remarks concerning both the data and the analysis are called for. 
The data do not provide answers to the explicit question “Is the demonstration effect a 
reason for your choice of distance from the parental home?”15 This means that the reported 
                                               
15 The data include, however, answers to two questions that relate to the relationship between parents (G) and their 
children (P). To a certain extent, these answers provide information on the attention and care provided by P to G 
when demonstrating to K. The first question relates to the frequency of contact with a given child either personally, 
by phone or mail. The second question concerns the amount of help (including personal care, practical household 
care, or help with paperwork) received from a given child. Supplementary tests, based on the ordered logit model, for 
the link between children’s gender and parenthood status and the frequency of their contact with their parents reveal 
that in the four countries examined, daughters who are mothers stay in closer contact with their parents than childless 
daughters, childless sons, and sons who are fathers. Similar tests of the provision of help confirm that in Belgium and 
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differences between the countries may be attributed also to factors other than the extent of 
individual engagement in demonstration activities. In particular, it could be argued that the 
proximity that is at the heart of this paper is attributable to a preference of parents, P, with 
children, K, to live near the grandparents because of the potential assistance that P could receive 
from G in caring for K, rather than to the urge of P to demonstrate care for G (Rogerson et al., 
1993; Compton and Pollak, 2014). The differences between countries in the effect of gender / 
parenthood on location choices may also be driven by social norms and, in particular, by gender 
norms: because of the traditional perceptions of women and their role in society in terms of care 
provision, daughters will be more likely than sons to care for their parents in the latters’ old age 
and, thus, they will be more likely than sons to live close to their parents. The finding that 
daughters with children live closer to their parents’ home than childless daughters can also be 
influenced by the extent of conformity to existing norms. In particular, in deciding to have 
children, daughters, as mothers, may be more likely than childless daughters to conform to social 
pressures concerning the roles of women. Consequently, because of greater adherence to social 
norms, daughters with children might be more likely to care for their parents in their old age and, 
thereby, to live closer to their parents than childless daughters.16   
The countries selected for our analysis differ with respect to childcare arrangements and 
related perceptions of gender roles (Table 4). Data provided by Eurostat reveal that Denmark and 
Sweden are characterized by one of the highest shares of children aged 0-3 who are covered by 
formal childcare. In contrast, in Belgium and France it is more common to draw on informal 
childcare, including assistance provided by the grandparents. Similarly, in Belgium and France 
we observe perceptions of gender roles that are somewhat more traditional than in Denmark and 
Sweden. These differences could imply that in Belgium and France, children who are parents, 
namely both daughters who are mothers and sons who are fathers, might have a stronger 
predisposition to live close to their parents in order to receive help with childcare than 
                                                                                                                                                        
France where, due to relatively low provision of institutional elderly care, women’s engagement in demonstration is 
expected to be greater than in Denmark and Sweden, daughters who are mothers are more likely to provide help to 
their parents than childless sons and sons who are fathers. Detailed results from the supplementary tests are available 
from the authors on request.  
16 Empirically it is, however, difficult to separate the factor role of individual conformity to social norms from the 
factor individual engagement in demonstration activities which are correlated with parenthood, because both factors 
are not directly observed in the data.  
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comparable daughters and sons in Denmark and Sweden, where informal family childcare is not 
common.  
Table 4. Childcare indicators for the selected countries 
Country / 
Indicator Childcare Perceptions of gender roles 
 
Formal childcare 
- children aged 0-
3: % coverage 
rate 
% of children using 
informal childcare 
arrangements during 
a typical week: 
children aged 0-2 
% of children 
using informal 
childcare 
arrangements 
during a typical 
week: children 
aged 3-5 
% of population 
agreeing with the 
statement that a 
pre-school child 
suffers when a 
mother works 
% of population 
agreeing with the 
statement that men 
are less competent 
than women at 
performing 
household tasks 
Source Eurostat (1) OECD Family database (2) 
European Value 
Survey and 
International 
Social Survey 
Program (3) 
Eurobarometer (4) 
    
Denmark 72.63 0.00 0.00 24 22 
Sweden 51.25 0.27 0.42 19 30 
      
Belgium 40.63 19.36 21.79 38 36 
France 37.25 17.36 19.26 41 31 
Notes: Formal childcare represents the percent of children aged 0-3 covered by care provided by public and private 
institutions. Informal childcare represents the percent of children receiving informal care that is usually provided by 
a grandparent or by other relatives, friends, or neighbors. The latter category excludes any care that is paid for, 
regardless of who provides the paid care. The data presented in columns (1) through (4) refer to / are obtained as 
follows. The data in column (1) represent a mean value for the years 2005-2012, and are extracted from an on-line 
database available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database. The Column (2) data are for the year 2014, and are 
extracted from an on-line database OECD Family Database available at 
http://www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm. The column (3) data represent a mean value for the years 2002, 2008 
and 2012, and are extracted from European Value Survey for 2008, available at http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/  
and International Social Survey Program for 2002 and 2012, available at http://www.issp.org/menu-top/home/. The 
column (4) data refer to the year 2014, and are extracted from Eurobarometer (2015).  
 
An empirical check of the relevance of an alternative hypothesis concerning potential 
gains from grandparents’ childcare assistance could be carried out in several ways. In Table 5 we 
present additional p-values obtained by testing for differences between the location of daughters 
with children and the location of childless daughters, sons with children, and childless sons. The 
reported values are for robustness checks that we performed in order to disentangle the 
demonstration effect from the effect of grandchild care assistance provided by the grandparents.   
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Table 5. P-values obtained for robustness tests of the significance of differences in migration behavior of daughters with children, childless daughters, 
childless sons, and sons with children  
Country / Ordered 
logit 
Binary 
logit (1) 
Binary 
logit (2) 
Binary 
logit (3) 
Ordered 
logit 
Binary 
logit (1) 
Binary 
logit (2) 
Binary 
logit (3) 
Ordered 
logit 
Binary 
logit (1) 
Binary 
logit (2) 
Binary 
logit (3) Model 
Test 1: Daughters with children (mothers M) migrate closer 
than daughters with no children (non-mothers NM) 
Test 2: Daughters with children (mothers M) 
migrate closer than sons with children (fathers F) 
Test 3: Daughters with children (mothers M) 
migrate closer than sons with no children (non-
fathers NF) 
Sub-sample of childless individuals and individuals with children older than 3 years 
Denmark 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.584 0.855 0.831 0.018 0.036 0.679 0.023 0.001 
Sweden 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.551 0.834 0.699 0.207 0.000 0.006 0.008 0.000 
Belgium  0.000 0.024 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 
France 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.030 0.010 0.068 0.165 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Sub-sample of childless individuals and individuals with children older than 6 years 
Denmark 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.536 0.806 0.782 0.022 0.030 0.620 0.023 0.001 
Sweden 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.629 0.909 0.651 0.251 0.000 0.009 0.008 0.000 
Belgium  0.000 0.012 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 
France 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.094 0.044 0.145 0.274 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Sub-sample of individuals whose parents are in poor health 
Denmark 0.010 0.249 0.001 0.029 0.356 0.580 0.456 0.058 0.193 0.703 0.219 0.011 
Sweden 0.000 0.008 0.001 0.000 0.389 0.764 0.422 0.067 0.018 0.143 0.150 0.001 
Belgium  0.001 0.017 0.001 0.088 0.008 0.013 0.058 0.044 0.014 0.057 0.012 0.046 
France 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.025 0.112 0.073 0.328 0.190 0.016 0.109 0.015 0.024 
Sub-sample of childless individuals and individuals with children that are not cared for by their grandparents “almost daily”  
Denmark 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.419 0.817 0.641 0.014 0.010 0.525 0.004 0.000 
Sweden 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.363 0.689 0.494 0.171 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.000 
Belgium  0.011 0.178 0.003 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.004 0.048 0.003 0.002 
France 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.051 0.013 0.120 0.226 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000 
Sub-sample of childless individuals and individuals with children that are not cared for by their grandparents “almost daily” or not cared for “almost every week”  
Denmark 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.238 0.694 0.503 0.007 0.227 0.912 0.130 0.015 
Sweden 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.529 0.774 0.646 0.295 0.039 0.209 0.431 0.001 
Belgium  0.793 0.904 0.640 0.554 0.001 0.002 0.014 0.025 0.725 0.795 0.659 0.340 
France 0.424 0.349 0.140 0.685 0.361 0.112 0.434 0.604 0.134 0.804 0.214 0.016 
Sub-sample of individuals whose parents have more than two grandchildren 
Denmark 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.381 0.744 0.630 0.022 0.020 0.518 0.011 0.002 
Sweden 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.382 0.616 0.532 0.221 0.000 0.004 0.051 0.000 
Belgium  0.000 0.016 0.000 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.008 0.012 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
France 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.101 0.038 0.271 0.248 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Sub-sample of individuals whose parents have more than three grandchildren 
Denmark 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.437 0.812 0.559 0.031 0.022 0.512 0.011 0.003 
Sweden 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.891 0.900 0.942 0.684 0.020 0.064 0.311 0.002 
Belgium  0.003 0.031 0.003 0.041 0.015 0.022 0.060 0.127 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.012 
France 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.328 0.260 0.449 0.466 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.000 
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First, consideration of the age of the children could help distinguish between these two 
effects, as the age of the children at which assistance from the grandparents in caring for them is 
most valuable differs from the age of the children at which their amenability to demonstration is 
the highest; in the former case the children are younger than in the latter (Stark, 1999). Thus, if 
consideration of the former type is the determinant of proximity then, as the children mature, 
there will be no reason to limit the distance from the parental home, while retaining proximity 
will be more in line with the demonstration effect motive. Reasoning in this way, it might be 
expected that the location choices of parents whose children are not too young to require much 
care by other family members including the grandparents, yet are old enough to be inculcated (for 
example by means of being taken to visit the grandparents) are not driven by considerations of 
grandparents’ childcare provision but, rather, by demonstration effect considerations. 
Constraining the sample to P with K who are at an age in which P could gain considerably less 
from G caring for K thus enables us to substantially discount childcare as a potential determinant 
of the location choices of P, and to test whether differences in migration behavior by gender and 
by parenthood status still hold. The SHARE dataset enables us to elicit information concerning 
the age of the youngest child (K) of an individual (P). Thus, it is possible to exclude from the 
analysis individuals (P) whose youngest child (K) is of an age at which grandparents’ care is 
highly valued. We consider this age to be up to three years, and we therefore re-ran the analysis 
for the sub-sample consisting of childless individuals and individuals who have children that are 
older than three years. The p-values obtained are different from the ones presented in the 
preceding subsection, but they indicate that the main conclusions continue to hold: in all four 
countries, daughters who are mothers tend to live closer to their parents than childless daughters 
and sons, and in Belgium and France they also choose to live closer to their parents than sons 
who are fathers (refer to Table 5). This evidence speaks in favor of the demonstration effect 
hypothesis rather than supporting the notion of proximity being governed by considerations of 
potential gains from grandparents’ childcare assistance. We also restrict the sample to individuals 
with children of school age (older than six). This restriction yields different p-values for the three 
tests of differences in the probability of moving farther away from the parental home between 
daughters who are mothers and the remaining categories. The main conclusions, however, still 
hold (refer to Table 5). 
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Another strategy for testing the hypothesis of location choices, based on potential gains 
from grandparents’ childcare, would be to examine the proximity between grandparents and their 
children while focusing only on grandparents who are not in a physical condition to be able to 
provide childcare. Such a test will require restricting the sample to grandparents who are in poor 
health, which is also possible when using the SHARE data.17 When we did that, we still found 
significant differences between the location of daughters who are mothers and the location of 
childless daughters, but less evidence of difference between the location of daughters who are 
mothers and the locations of childless sons and sons who are fathers.  
In a similar way, instead of considering the grandparents’ ability to provide care for their 
grandchildren, it would be reasonable to explore the actual provision of such care. Obviously, if 
the grandparents do not provide childcare, then the parents do not receive benefits in the form of 
such assistance, and the parents’ choice of location in relation to the grandparents’ home will not 
be affected by such benefits. The SHARE data contain information on the intensity of the 
grandparents’ care for the grandchildren, so it is possible to restrict the analysis to individuals 
whose parents do not engage in care for their grandchildren on a regular basis. The migration 
behavior of such individuals should be expected to be less affected by the potential gains from 
obtaining grandparents’ care and, thus, to a greater extent be driven by demonstration activities. 
We considered regular grandparents’ childcare as a care that is provided “almost daily,” and we 
dropped from the sample daughters and sons who have children that are cared for by their 
grandparents on a daily basis.18 As shown in Table 5, with the exception of the first binary logit 
for Denmark, the results reaffirm the finding of a difference between the location of daughters 
with children and the location of childless sons. Similarly, with the exception of the first binary 
logit for Belgium, we found a significant difference between the location of daughters who are 
mothers and the location of childless daughters. With regard to comparisons between the location 
of daughters who are mothers and the location of sons who are fathers, we found a significant 
difference for Belgium, but less stark difference for France. In terms of the intensity of childcare 
provided by the grandparents, we also imposed a less stringent restriction, dropping from the 
                                               
17 It might be argued that focusing on very old grandparents could also help to separate the demonstration effect from 
grandparents’ childcare assistance. Focusing on very old grandparents, however, implies that the sample is limited 
not only to very old first generation but also to old second and third generations. In other words, parents themselves 
and their children are likely to be old when grandparents are very old.   
18 Grandparents’ care refers to care that the grandparents provide to the grandchildren when the parents are not 
present.     
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sample daughters and sons who have children that are cared for by their grandparents “almost 
daily” or “almost every week.” This resulted in reduced differences between the location of 
daughters who are mothers and the location of the other three groups of individuals. Such a 
finding could possibly stem from the fact that grandparents’ care that is provided “almost every 
week” can also be given during weekly visits that are motivated by demonstration effect 
considerations. 
We also conducted a test aimed at exploring the competition among grandchildren for 
grandparents’ care. It might be postulated that when there are more grandchildren, the 
grandparents’ care is likely to be more dilute than when there is only one grandchild. Thus, when 
we consider individuals whose parents have many grandchildren and still find differences in the 
location proximity of daughters who are mothers, childless daughters and sons, and sons who are 
fathers, we could conjecture that the differences are likely to arise from demonstration activities 
and not from grandparents’ provision of childcare. We imposed two restrictions in terms of the 
number of grandchildren, thereby limiting the sample to individuals: (1) whose parents have 
more than two grandchildren, and (2) whose parents have more than three grandchildren. When 
we confined the sample to individuals whose parents have more than two grandchildren, then for 
all four countries we still found significant differences between the location of daughters who are 
mothers and the location of childless daughters and childless sons. The differences between the 
location of daughters who are mothers and the location of sons who are fathers were also still 
significant for Belgium, but not for France. When we ran the analysis for the sample that is 
restricted to individuals whose parents have more than three grandchildren, we obtained 
somewhat larger p-values in all the tests, yet the main conclusions remained unaffected. 
Finally, to disentangle the demonstration effect from childcare provided by the 
grandparents, we exploited the longitudinal nature of the SHARE data and examined changes in 
migration over time. If the reason for staying close to the parental home is assistance with 
childcare provided by the grandparents, we can expect that parents will tend to move farther 
away from the grandparents’ home when their children (and they) get older. After all, if the value 
of care provided by the grandparents for very young grandchildren is a reason for proximity then, 
once the children mature, that value will diminish greatly, and migration farther afield will be 
likely to take place. If demonstration is the cause of proximity, then it will be bad to signal to K 
that the reason for locating near G is to exploit the K-care services of G rather than for P to care 
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for G. Thus, if demonstration is the motive, we will not expect to observe intensified migration as 
would be the case when the motive is grandparent assistance with childcare. The SHARE data 
allow us to follow individuals for four waves, over a time span of approximately ten years. One 
limitation of using the SHARE data for tracking change in migration patterns is the measurement 
of distance in the form of categories. Because this measure is not precise, we observe only 
changes across aggregate distance categories, and it is possible that there are more frequent 
changes in location which we are unable to identify. In our sample, for the four countries 
combined, there are 4,587 individuals and 3,410 parents who in the ten-year time span covered 
by the four data waves changed their location. The proportion of parents who move far away is 
higher than 50 percent, but the migration behavior of parents is not distinct from and, in 
particular, is not more intensified than the migration behavior of childless individuals. 
In conclusion, the results obtained from the auxiliary tests aimed at distinguishing the 
effect of demonstration activities from the effect of potential gains from grandparents’ childcare 
assistance reaffirm our findings that in all four countries, daughters who are mothers choose to 
live closer to their parents than childless daughters and childless sons. While the role of 
grandparents’ care in driving the difference in the migration behavior of daughters who are 
mothers and sons who are fathers is also marginal in Belgium, in France we find mixed results, 
which suggest that grandparents’ care assistance could partially influence the location choices of 
fathers and mothers.   
 
7. Conclusions  
We presented a hypothesis that links negatively the optimal migration distance from the parents’ 
home and the importance attached to care to be received from children in the future. We 
conjectured that daughters who are mothers have a stronger incentive than sons who are fathers, 
childless daughters, and childless sons to demonstrate to their children appropriate care-giving to 
parents, and that because proximity to parents renders such a demonstration more effective and 
less costly, we predicted that the migration distance away from the parental home will be shorter 
for women who are mothers than for the other three groups.  
We obtained empirical support for these predictions. Using SHARE data on the distance 
between the location of parents and the location of their children who moved out of the parental 
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home, we found that daughters who have children choose to live closer to their parents’ home 
than otherwise comparable childless daughters, childless sons, and sons who have children. We 
also found that the difference between the migration behavior of daughters who are mothers and 
sons who are fathers is related to the extent of the generosity of the welfare state. In particular, 
the difference is observed in Belgium and France, where state support for the elderly is weak, and 
care is mostly provided within the family, but not in Denmark and Sweden, where institutional 
elderly care is generous. The observed differences are quite robust to the econometric model 
selected for analysis. In addition, the main conclusions hold when, to a large extent, we control 
for grandparents’ childcare assistance as a determinant of proximity.  
Our model and findings bear on migration research in a number of ways.  
First, a prediction of migration outcomes that fails to take into consideration female 
migration inertia stemming from demonstration effect activities will be biased because it will 
overestimate the likelihood of female migration.  
Second, because women who are mothers engage in demonstration effect activities and, 
therefore, hesitate to migrate, they may well reach different conclusions than men who are fathers 
as well as childless men and childless women, when making decisions concerning geographical 
mobility. For example, it cannot be excluded that women who are mothers will to a greater extent 
than the other three categories turn down a career move that requires them to redeploy and, thus, 
move away or farther away from their parents. In settings in which institutional childcare is 
patchy, women who are mothers and who seek to participate in the labor force might be better 
able to achieve this goal if they live near their mother’s home and receive some childcare 
assistance (Compton and Pollak, 2014). This consideration still leaves space for the 
demonstration effect approach to bite because if this effect is strong and the facilitation of labor 
market participation effect is weak, we will not discern a significant difference in migration 
behavior between mothers who participate in the labor force and those who do not.  
Third, we add to the line of work which states that there is more to migration than a 
response to wage differentials (Stark, 1993). We attribute migration behavior to a taste variable, 
namely we hypothesize that daughters with children reveal distaste for migrating far from the 
parental home. 
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Fourth, we point to the usefulness of future research into the influence of the scarcity of 
public goods (here public provision of old-age care) on migration patterns. 
The availability of more refined data than the ones used in this paper will facilitate 
additional tests of our hypothesis. For example, we could inquire whether in the absence of 
parents (deceased before their daughters had children) the migration pattern of women with 
children is similar to that of men with children and childless women and childless men. 
Specifically, we could test whether, in the absence of parents, women with children choose their 
place of residence on the same basis as the other three categories.  
In closing, it has occurred to us that several of the ailments that nowadays afflict the 
elderly (dementia, Alzheimer’s) require emotional support not less than physical treatment. In 
this respect, children are better providers, even when institutional care is provided by the state, or 
even when there are financial means to pay for institutional care. Consequently, instilling in 
children today the predisposition to care for their parents tomorrow can become especially 
important. Thus, the return from engagement in demonstration effect activities will not diminish 
even if and when the state assumes a greater role in old age care.19 
                                               
19 In a November 27 / December 4, 2017 article, Time magazine aptly noted that “When Congress [in the US] 
created Medicare and Medicaid in 1965 [as safety nets for older Americans], it was still common for people to die of 
acute medical issues like heart attacks; now many survive those traumas and go on to live . . . for decades longer.” 
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Appendix A: Modeling the value of care to be received in old age and the choice of 
migration distance  
Consider an individual who belongs to the cohort of parents, P. She (he) seeks to maximize her 
(his) expected utility, ( , )EU x d , where x is the intensity of care that P provides to G, and d is the 
distance between the location to which P migrates and the parental household. Suppose that with 
probability ( ) (0,1)xπ ∈ , K will imitate P’s care-giving behavior, whereas with probability 
1 ( )xπ− , K will choose to give to P some level of care, y , independently of the values of x  and 
d. P derives utility from the future care to be received from K, and from income obtained in the 
location to which P migrates, with corresponding weights  w  and ( )1 w− , where ( )0,1w∈ , and 
disutility from the cost of engaging in effective demonstration activities. We seek to obtain a 
relationship between the distance, d, and the weight, w , which is attached to the utility derived 
from care received. 
In this setting, the expected utility function that P maximizes is  
 
( , ) ( )[ ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( , )]
[1 ( )][ ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( , )]
EU x d x wf x w a d c d x
x wf y w a d c d x
π
π
= + − −
+ − + − −
 (A1) 
where ( )xπ  is an increasing function; ( )f ⋅  is an increasing function that converts care expected 
in the future to utility; ( )a d  is the utility from income earned in the location at distance d from 
P’s parental home (because we take it that migration occurs, ( )a d  is greater than (0)a  for some 
positive values of d ); and ( , )c d x  represents the cost of engaging in effective demonstration 
activities, which increases in both its arguments. The functions π , f , a , and c  are continuously 
twice differentiable with respect to their arguments. We further assume that 
 ( , ) ( ) ( )c d x b d g x=   (A2) 
where the functions ( )b d  and ( )g x  are increasing and continuously differentiable. P chooses 
both x  and d  so as to maximize her (his) expected utility as given in (A1). 
 After inserting (A2) into (A1) and rearranging, (A1) takes the form 
 ( , ) ( ) ( ) [1 ( )] ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )EU x d x wf x x wf y w a d b d g xπ π= + − + − − . (A3) 
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We assume that functions π , f , a , b , g  and the values of the parameter w  considered are 
such that the maximization problem has a unique internal solution. The first order conditions of 
the maximization problem are 
 ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0x x x x xEU x d x wf x x wf x x wf y b d g xπ π π= + − − =  (A4) 
and 
 ( , ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0d d dEU x d w a d b d g x= − − = . (A5) 
Using the implicit function theorem, we can express x  which is a solution to (A5) as a function 
of d , namely ( )x x d= , and rewrite equation (A5) as    
 ( ( ), ) 0dEU x d d = . (A6) 
Differentiating (A6) with respect to d  yields 
 ( ( ), ) ( ) ( ( ), ) 0dx d ddEU x d d x d EU x d d+ = , (A7) 
which can be rewritten as 
 ( ( ), )( )
( ( ), )
dd
d
dx
EU x d dx d
EU x d d
= − . (A8) 
Thus, the first order conditions (A4) and (A5) are equivalent to the condition  
 
( ( ), )
( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ( )) 0.
x
x x x x
EU x d d
x d wf x d x d wf x d x d wf y b d g x dπ π π= + − − =
 (A9) 
Equation (A9) gives the optimal distance *d  as a function of the parameter w , which we can 
express as * *( )d d w= . Thus, the optimal care given is * *( ( ))x x d w= . Equation (A9) can then be 
written as 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* * * *
* * * * *
( ( ( )), ( )) ( ( )) ( ( ))
( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( ( )) 0.
x x
x x x
EU x d w d w x d w wf x d w
x d w wf x d w x d w wf y b d w g x d w
π
π π
=
+ − − =
 (A10) 
We differentiate (A10) with respect to w , and obtain 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* * * *
* * * * * *
( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( )
( ) ( ( )) ( ( ( )), ( )) ( ( ( )), ( )) 0
x x
w d xx xd
x d w f x d w x d w f x d w f y
d w x d w EU x d w d w EU x d w d w
π π " #+ −% &
" #+ + =% &
 (A11) 
which can be rearranged into 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* * * **
* * * * *
( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( )
( )
( ( )) ( ( ( )), ( )) ( ( ( )), ( ))
x x
w
d xx xd
x d w f x d w x d w f x d w f y
d w
x d w EU x d w d w EU x d w d w
π π " #+ −% &= −
+
. (A12) 
We naturally assume that the intensity of care chosen by P so as to set in motion the 
demonstration effect, *( ( ))x d w , is higher than the intensity of care to be provided by K to P 
independent of the demonstration effect, y , namely we assume that *( ( ))x d w y> . Because the 
functions f  and π  are increasing ( ( ) 0, ( ) 0xxf π⋅ > ⋅ > ), we then know that the numerator in 
(A12) is positive. 
We use (A8) to establish that the denominator in (A12) is positive too: 
 
* * * * *
* *
* * * *
* *
* * * *
* *
( ( )) ( ( ( )), ( )) ( ( ( )), ( ))
( ( ( )), ( )) ( ( ( )), ( )) ( ( ( )), ( ))
( ( ( )), ( ))
( ( ( )), ( )) ( ( ( )), ( ))1
( ( ( )), ( ))
d xx xd
dd
xx xd
dx
dd xx
dx x
x d w EU x d w d w EU x d w d w
EU x d w d w EU x d w d w EU x d w d w
EU x d w d w
EU x d w d w EU x d w d w
EU x d w d w EU
+
= − +
−
=
− * * * *
.
( ( ( )), ( )) ( ( ( )), ( ))d dxx d w d w EU x d w d w
" #
$ %
$ %& '
 (A13) 
We know that the term in square brackets in (A13) is positive because this term is one of the 
second order conditions of the maximization (the determinant of the Hessian matrix of ( , )EU x d  
has to be positive when evaluated at * *( , ) ( , )x d x d= ). In addition, from differentiation of (A3) 
with respect to d  and x , it follows that  
 ( )* * * *( ( ( ), ( )) ( ( )) ( ( )) 0dx d xEU x d w d w b d w g x d w= − < , (A14) 
because the functions b  and g  are increasing. Thus, the denominator in (A12) is positive. We 
conclude then that (A12) must be negative, namely 
 * ( ) 0wd w < . (A15) 
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Inequality (A15) displays the relationship between the distance, d , and the weight, w , attached 
to the utility derived from the future care to be received from K: the higher the weight, the 
smaller the distance chosen by P. 
We postulate that the weight attached by a female P (a daughter) to the utility derived 
from care to be received in the future from K, (0,1)fw ∈ , is higher than the weight attached by a 
male P (a son) to the utility derived from care to be received in the future from K, (0,1)mw ∈ , 
namely f mw w> . Assuming that for all { , }f mw w w=  the maximization problem has a unique 
internal solution, condition (A15) ensures that 
 * *( ) ( )f md w d w<  (A16) 
namely daughters who are mothers choose to live closer to their parents than comparable sons. 
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Appendix B: Coefficients and standard errors obtained from estimating ordered logit and 
binary logit models for each country  
Table B. 1. Estimated coefficients from the ordered logit model by country 
 Denmark  Sweden  Belgium  France  
Variable  coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
Parent -0.165** -0.276*** -0.048 -0.287*** 
  (0.074) (0.065) (0.065) (0.066) 
Female 0.297*** 0.246*** -0.034 -0.046 
  (0.078) (0.070) (0.073) (0.070) 
Parent x female -0.313*** -0.270*** -0.190** -0.073 
  (0.093) (0.083) (0.086) (0.084) 
Age 0.002 0.004 -0.010*** 0.007*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Education: lower secondary 0.283* -0.149 -0.248** 0.154 
  (0.172) (0.162) (0.106) (0.104) 
Education: upper secondary and secondary non-tertiary 0.490*** 0.010 -0.142 0.157* 
  (0.165) (0.159) (0.100) (0.081) 
Education: first and second stage tertiary 1.013*** 0.766*** 0.386*** 0.946*** 
  (0.167) (0.162) (0.101) (0.086) 
Married or in a relationship  0.018 -0.001 -0.007 0.006 
  (0.051) (0.053) (0.056) (0.046) 
Married but living separately from a spouse 0.430** -0.150 0.153 0.041 
  (0.209) (0.330) (0.153) (0.148) 
Divorced  0.219** 0.069 0.130 0.008 
  (0.086) (0.094) (0.081) (0.085) 
Widowed 0.479* -0.047 0.087 0.285 
  (0.278) (0.309) (0.212) (0.197) 
Working indicator -0.210*** -0.319*** -0.218*** -0.189*** 
  (0.054) (0.050) (0.053) (0.048) 
Number of siblings -0.006 0.063** 0.071*** -0.007 
  (0.030) (0.026) (0.022) (0.021) 
Being the youngest child indicator -0.076 -0.044 -0.112*** -0.031 
  (0.048) (0.043) (0.042) (0.040) 
Parent: presence of a partner 0.002 0.050 -0.058 0.106** 
  (0.061) (0.057) (0.051) (0.052) 
Parent: good health indicator 0.110* 0.080* 0.019 0.188*** 
  (0.057) (0.047) (0.045) (0.044) 
Place of living: a big city -0.772*** -0.752*** 0.025 -0.232** 
  (0.101) (0.085) (0.089) (0.102) 
Place of living: the suburbs or outskirts of a big city -0.705*** -0.653*** -0.307*** -0.371*** 
  (0.080) (0.068) (0.067) (0.070) 
Place of living: a large town -0.287*** -0.285*** -0.039 -0.110 
  (0.081) (0.068) (0.078) (0.074) 
Place of living: a small town -0.162** -0.254*** -0.171*** -0.077 
  (0.064) (0.065) (0.058) (0.055) 
Cutpoint 1 -0.920*** -1.265*** -1.194*** -0.849*** 
  (0.247) (0.248) (0.184) (0.176) 
Cutpoint 2 0.362 -0.208 0.262 0.247 
  (0.246) (0.248) (0.183) (0.176) 
Cutpoint 3 1.461*** 0.610** 1.683*** 1.099*** 
  (0.246) (0.248) (0.184) (0.177) 
Number of observations 12,083 15,017 17,361 16,665 
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Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis; time fixed effects included in the regressions; *** denotes 
statistical significance with p-value <0.01, ** denotes statistical significance with p-value <0.05, * denotes statistical 
significance with p-value <0.1. 
 
Table B. 2. Estimated coefficients from the binary logit (1) by country 
  Denmark Sweden Belgium France 
Variable coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
Parent -0.067 -0.305*** 0.002 -0.115 
  (0.096) (0.081) (0.072) (0.085) 
Female 0.419*** 0.189** -0.064 0.135 
  (0.106) (0.087) (0.081) (0.097) 
Parent x female -0.351*** -0.167 -0.163* -0.323*** 
  (0.126) (0.104) (0.097) (0.114) 
Age 0.000 0.002 -0.015*** -0.001 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Education: lower secondary 0.203 -0.309 -0.320** 0.257** 
  (0.219) (0.206) (0.129) (0.123) 
Education: upper secondary and secondary non-tertiary 0.353* -0.096 -0.238* 0.166* 
  (0.212) (0.201) (0.123) (0.094) 
Education: first and second stage tertiary 0.754*** 0.525** 0.181 0.871*** 
  (0.216) (0.205) (0.125) (0.102) 
Married or in a relationship  0.158** 0.168** 0.090 0.099 
  (0.070) (0.066) (0.061) (0.061) 
Married but living separately from a spouse 0.597* -0.164 0.179 0.044 
  (0.352) (0.402) (0.170) (0.193) 
Divorced  0.322*** 0.202* 0.202** -0.034 
  (0.115) (0.116) (0.094) (0.101) 
Widowed 0.443 -0.057 0.105 0.317 
  (0.360) (0.315) (0.222) (0.222) 
Working indicator -0.162** -0.327*** -0.168*** -0.130** 
  (0.071) (0.066) (0.058) (0.060) 
Number of siblings -0.020 0.047 0.049** 0.004 
  (0.035) (0.034) (0.022) (0.028) 
Being the youngest child indicator -0.059 -0.105* -0.090* -0.098* 
  (0.065) (0.055) (0.048) (0.055) 
Parent: presence of a partner 0.045 0.062 -0.088 0.059 
  (0.077) (0.068) (0.056) (0.065) 
Parent: good health indicator 0.020 0.038 -0.014 0.106* 
  (0.072) (0.056) (0.049) (0.056) 
Place of living: a big city -1.083*** -0.996*** -0.109 -0.371*** 
  (0.119) (0.108) (0.093) (0.120) 
Place of living: the suburbs or outskirts of a big city -0.749*** -0.603*** -0.302*** -0.328*** 
  (0.113) (0.103) (0.075) (0.091) 
Place of living: a large town -0.754*** -0.699*** -0.146* -0.372*** 
  (0.107) (0.093) (0.083) (0.086) 
Place of living: a small town -0.331*** -0.421*** -0.181*** -0.249*** 
  (0.100) (0.093) (0.062) (0.070) 
Constant 1.209*** 1.644*** 1.494*** 1.102*** 
  (0.309) (0.307) (0.205) (0.221) 
Number of observations 12,083 15,017 17,361 16,665 
Notes: The same as per Table B.1. 
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Table B. 3. Estimated coefficients from the binary logit (2) by country 
  Denmark Sweden Belgium France 
Variable coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
Parent -0.252*** -0.194*** -0.103 -0.305*** 
  (0.085) (0.073) (0.079) (0.073) 
Female 0.328*** 0.289*** -0.015 0.042 
  (0.088) (0.076) (0.084) (0.079) 
Parent x female -0.308*** -0.296*** -0.198* -0.142 
  (0.108) (0.092) (0.101) (0.094) 
Age 0.003 0.004 -0.006* 0.008*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Education: lower secondary 0.331 -0.255 -0.172 0.092 
  (0.236) (0.188) (0.144) (0.119) 
Education: upper secondary and secondary 
non-tertiary 0.603*** -0.099 -0.058 0.134 
  (0.230) (0.187) (0.134) (0.091) 
Education: first and second stage tertiary 1.186*** 0.665*** 0.601*** 0.920*** 
  (0.232) (0.189) (0.134) (0.097) 
Married or in a relationship  -0.031 -0.053 -0.096 -0.022 
  (0.058) (0.059) (0.066) (0.054) 
Married but living separately from a spouse 0.472* -0.211 0.166 -0.006 
  (0.255) (0.374) (0.178) (0.162) 
Divorced  0.184* 0.026 0.049 0.017 
  (0.099) (0.106) (0.097) (0.095) 
Widowed 0.504* -0.007 0.078 0.197 
  (0.303) (0.326) (0.241) (0.207) 
Working indicator -0.239*** -0.314*** -0.240*** -0.219*** 
  (0.062) (0.057) (0.063) (0.053) 
Number of siblings -0.019 0.050* 0.077*** -0.000 
  (0.034) (0.028) (0.024) (0.025) 
Being the youngest child indicator -0.089 -0.030 -0.158*** -0.010 
  (0.055) (0.048) (0.052) (0.046) 
Parent: presence of a partner 0.010 0.005 -0.055 0.113** 
  (0.069) (0.064) (0.063) (0.058) 
Parent: good health indicator 0.134** 0.094* 0.061 0.156*** 
  (0.067) (0.053) (0.055) (0.050) 
Place of living: a big city -0.884*** -0.829*** 0.080 -0.464*** 
  (0.113) (0.096) (0.099) (0.107) 
Place of living: the suburbs or outskirts of a 
big city -0.939*** -0.851*** -0.314*** -0.531*** 
  (0.099) (0.085) (0.085) (0.081) 
Place of living: a large town -0.180** -0.292*** 0.049 -0.219*** 
  (0.090) (0.078) (0.088) (0.079) 
Place of living: a small town -0.112 -0.272*** -0.132* -0.113* 
  (0.079) (0.078) (0.070) (0.061) 
Constant -0.430 0.383 -0.546** -0.200 
  (0.307) (0.283) (0.228) (0.198) 
Number of observations 12,083 15,017 17,361 16,665 
Notes: The same as per Table B.1. 
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Table B. 4. Estimated coefficients from the binary logit (3) by country 
  Denmark Sweden Belgium France 
Variable coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
Parent -0.147 -0.343*** -0.154 -0.396*** 
  (0.094) (0.078) (0.122) (0.078) 
Female 0.168* 0.256*** -0.081 -0.199** 
  (0.095) (0.077) (0.120) (0.079) 
Parent x female -0.351*** -0.320*** -0.188 0.120 
  (0.119) (0.096) (0.151) (0.098) 
Age 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.011*** 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Education: lower secondary 0.425 0.089 -0.353 0.077 
  (0.314) (0.223) (0.239) (0.142) 
Education: upper secondary and secondary non-tertiary 0.654** 0.189 0.020 0.144 
  (0.303) (0.219) (0.214) (0.107) 
Education: first and second stage tertiary 1.257*** 1.054*** 0.703*** 1.002*** 
  (0.303) (0.222) (0.212) (0.110) 
Married or in a relationship  -0.059 -0.087 -0.210** -0.034 
  (0.066) (0.062) (0.099) (0.054) 
Married but living separately from a spouse 0.277 -0.252 0.055 0.056 
  (0.284) (0.433) (0.282) (0.180) 
Divorced  0.194* 0.015 0.045 0.086 
  (0.113) (0.114) (0.142) (0.101) 
Widowed 0.498 0.049 0.159 0.363* 
  (0.339) (0.392) (0.328) (0.215) 
Working indicator -0.280*** -0.338*** -0.429*** -0.227*** 
  (0.069) (0.058) (0.097) (0.057) 
Number of siblings 0.014 0.079*** 0.130*** -0.022 
  (0.042) (0.030) (0.040) (0.023) 
Being the youngest child indicator -0.096 -0.013 -0.081 -0.002 
  (0.063) (0.051) (0.079) (0.048) 
Parent: presence of a partner -0.050 0.069 0.122 0.141** 
  (0.080) (0.068) (0.098) (0.062) 
Parent: good health indicator 0.191** 0.102* 0.019 0.284*** 
  (0.078) (0.059) (0.091) (0.053) 
Place of living: a big city -0.300** -0.589*** 0.320** -0.005 
  (0.125) (0.106) (0.143) (0.116) 
Place of living: the suburbs or outskirts of a big city -0.493*** -0.716*** -0.457*** -0.279*** 
  (0.114) (0.089) (0.135) (0.088) 
Place of living: a large town -0.070 -0.047 0.134 0.151* 
  (0.101) (0.080) (0.130) (0.084) 
Place of living: a small town -0.148* -0.176** -0.350*** 0.082 
  (0.088) (0.082) (0.119) (0.064) 
Constant -1.684*** -0.938*** -2.243*** -1.325*** 
  (0.393) (0.319) (0.354) (0.215) 
Number of observations 12,083 15,017 17,361 16,665 
Notes: The same as per Table B.1. 
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